ONG-STANDING GRIEVANCES by Achenese against the Indonesian government emerged in 1998 as widespread revelations of mass graves in the province, one by a Parliamentary Investigation Commission, forced the Indonesian armed forces commander, Wiranto, to apologize for past abuses by his soldiers. Serious and systematic violations of human rights by the armed forces of Indonesia had been reported by the United Nations, the State Department, and international human rights organizations since the early 90s (see Appendix A). The revelations provoked a nonviolent civil movement urging accountability on the part of the Indonesian military. In July 1999, former Attorney General Marzuki Darusman warned that the imminent referendum in East Timor "could have an impact in Acheh unless the government gets its act together in restoring justice [which is] what they want [in Acheh]." Unfortunately, Darusman's warning went unheeded by the government of Indonesia and its armed forces. Instead of justice, the Achenese - and the East Timorese - calls for justice were met with more repression.

As a result, in Acheh, the call for a referendum has gained widespread support by the population, which expressed its desires in two massive demonstrations on November 7, 1999 and November 8-11, 2000. These demonstrations were attended, according to varying sources by between half a million and two million people. According to KONTRAS, The Commission on Disappearances and Victims of Violence, the more recent demonstration was brutally repressed by the Indonesian military and police and resulted in 51 confirmed murders and hundreds of assaults. None other than the current chief of police of Acheh, Chaerul Rasyidi, a self-proclaimed admirer of Hitler (see footnote 128 of Appendix A) justified the brutal crackdown by equating those demonstrating nonviolently for a referendum with armed rebels. He stated, in a Detikworld article on November 15, 2000, that "realistically, the attitude of choosing a referendum is insurgency." The actual number of civilians murdered by security forces is likely much greater than reported; but access to remote areas where these crimes may have been committed is restricted by the armed forces. Recent reports indicate that the deaths from military and police operations after the fall of Suharto have exceeded deaths from operations under the dictator’s rule.

Instead of condemning those responsible for crimes against humanity in Acheh, the Indonesian government has given wider latitude to the main suspects. As in East Timor, where military officers allegedly responsible for such crimes have remained in power and even been promoted, Chief Rasyidi remains in charge in Acheh. Reformers have been sidelined.

The decade-long repressive activities of the Indonesian military and police and similar repression in East Timor have not muted calls for justice by Indonesians. And citizens of the United States have joined them in calling for an International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity committed before and after the destruction of East Timor in September 1999. The International Forum for Acheh reiterated its earlier demand for such an International Tribunal as well as one that would focus on crimes against humanity committed in Acheh, at its conference in Washington, D.C. in April 2001. As recently as June 6^th, 2001, over thirty human rights and religious organizations wrote to Secretary of State Colin Powell requesting him to support an International Tribunal for East Timor, citing the lack of political will or ability to prosecute the Indonesian armed forces through the national justice system. These organizations pointed out that such a tribunal will also "serve as a strong deterrent to future crimes by the Indonesian military (TNI) throughout the archipelago." [see Appendix A for nearly exhaustive documentation of the history of human rights abuses in Acheh by the Indonesian military and police.]

Internal conflicts tend to bleed into neighboring countries. Therefore the root cause of the problems in Acheh must be addressed by other governments, especially those in the region. This root cause is the impunity of the Indonesian armed forces, their territorial command structure as well as their economic and political power, which places them beyond accountability. If these forces remain above the law, U.S. interests in a free market, regional stability, and human rights will continue to be undermined. The threat to the rule of law and respect for human rights, a stated U.S. Government foreign policy priority is addressed in the Backgrounder below (see appendix A). The constitution of an international tribunal will further this interest.

Regional Stability

'Stability' has often been used as a code word for strengthening authoritarian governments or institutions. But the costs of doing so, especially in Indonesia today, will have devastating impacts on any promise of any stability which the U.S. Government can proudly justify to its citizens or to Indonesians. One predictable result of strengthening the hand of the Indonesian military by increasing military contacts with the United States will be an increase in internal conflict, corruption, and human rights violations.

Refugee flows, illicit drug and weapons markets, and trafficking in persons are endemic to armed internal conflict. The example of Burma provides a recent and poignant predictor of threats to the national security of S.E. Asia caused by internal conflicts in neighboring countries. The military dictatorship in Burma has dramatically impacted Thailand, resulting in a refugee crisis as well as a massive influx of illicit drugs, such as heroin and amphetamines, that continues to threaten its national security.

S.E. Asian nations have already felt the corrosive impacts of internal conflict in Indonesian on their own democratization programs caused by a black market in arms. A recent opinion piece in the Jakarta Post recognizes that arms trafficking is a regional problem which must be addressed by ASEAN countries. Dr. Rizal Sukma, Director of Studies at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, noted that the spread of small arms beyond legal authorities may originate from the problem within the military establishment of individual ASEAN countries. However, given the fact, for instance, that an estimated 1,000 Thai fishing boats operate in Indonesian waters and that, according to the Thai Armed Forces Security Centre's intelligence unit, some boats can be hired for an illicit arms run for as little as Baht 50,000 (US$1,100), supply will not be easily stemmed.

Within the existing regional arrangement dealing with small arms trafficking, weapons trafficking may be seen as an integral part of broader transnational crimes -- terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, piracy, and human trafficking. Incidents of piracy in and near the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have recently increased at an alarming rate, in both number and severity. Almost everybody acknowledges that the core of the problem is in Indonesia, where the general breakdown of order - and an apparent lack of will and resources to tackle the problem - appear to be the main factors in the rise of Southeast Asian piracy. A report of over one hundred "suspected Achenese rebels" traveling to Malaysia ostensibly to receive guerilla training underlies the risks to regional stability of the conflict in Acheh.

In this context, it is critical that Secretary of State Powell urge ASEAN nations at their annual meeting in Hanoi in July to foster justice by to act in their own self-interest by calling for an international tribunal on crimes committed in East Timor. Amnesty International has urged ASEAN countries ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to address "the rapidly deteriorating security and accompanying human rights violations in Acheh." The human rights organization pointed out that the ARF’s mandate required it to promote "the enhancement of political and security cooperation within the region as a means of ensuring a lasting peace, stability and prosperity for the region and its peoples" and noted that the Indonesian military’s impunity impedes this goal. Instead of focusing on the creation a massive law enforcement architecture to monitor and intercept the many sources of weapons supply, the U.S. Government must use a more effective and logical approach by attempting to understand and address diplomatically the call for justice fueling the demand for weapons.

The U.S. Government may anticipate that the military and police, seeing their role in resolving the conflict threatened, will fear that the next stage of addressing Indonesia’s problems will be accountability. Credibility in President Abdurahman Wahid’s government and his initial attempts to curb the influence of the military were undermined by a series of Christmas bombings for which nine generals are suspects. More bombings and other terrorist acts by these forces can be expected on the road to justice. Nevertheless, a protracted struggle can be expected given the deep-seated resentment of Achenese for the impunity of the armed forces for crimes committed against them, the mass base which the insurgents have been able to develop, and the ready access to weapons and money they enjoy. Nevertheless, the internal conflict in Acheh is unlikely to result in a "lasting peace" for reasons cogently reported elsewhere. Fortunately, however, a protracted struggle may be avoidable if the military and police are challenged internationally (regionally) and justice is thereby delivered.

'The police and military are in competition with each other in their business ventures. As a result of this competition, the military and police, often in collusion with civilian government officials, have generated violent disturbances to justify military or police "solutions" to non-existent threats.'

A Free Market

Economic incentives for these forces to maintain their grip on the territories in which they are deployed also exist. Human Rights Watch reported, in August 1999, evidence that violence surrounding troop removal in Lhokseumawe, North Acheh, where ExxonMobil is based, was engineered by Indonesian armed forces "unhappy at leaving lucrative extra budgetary sources of income, such as illegal logging and marijuana cultivation." Baihaki Hakim, the President of Pertamina, ExxonMobil’s partner in exploiting the massive Arun gas field in Acheh has admitted that "it [is] unclear who was fighting whom in Acheh."

The military and police raise 75-80% of their operating expenses from licit and illicit business activities. Their illicit businesses in Acheh include providing protection, extortion, drug-running, illegal timber harvesting, illegal fishing, illegal mining, and prostitution. The police and military are in competition with each other in their business ventures. As a result of this competition, the military and police, often in collusion with civilian government officials, have generated violent disturbances to justify military or police "solutions" to non-existent threats. The International Crisis Group reported in September 2000, that "(i)t is often claimed that military units exploit the opportunities available in disturbed regions, to supplement their incomes, especially by offering protection services." The report found that such claims can not be dismissed out of hand and the documentation of a "rivalry" between the police and military below (see Backgrounder Introduction and Appendix A) supports the theory that the security problems for ExxonMobil are due in large part to causes other than insurgency threats. Another report by an environmental and social justice organization, found that, in Acheh, there were " limitless opportunities to profit financially from this economically fertile region", reported that "(t)he elite military Kopassus command, under Suharto's son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, was thought to control the local marijuana business and, in one area at least, took control of gold mining."

The ICG also observed, in June 2001, market-distorting influences of the Indonesian armed forces. It will be useful to quote the ICG's findings at length: it found that "[t]he military…uses its influence to gain access to business opportunities for both individual officers and military business networks. Although public data is naturally not available, it would be most surprising if there were no military involvement in the many subcontracts let by companies clustered in the industrial complex at Lhokseumawe [ed. where ExxonMobil does business]. …The perceived capacity of military personnel to take retaliatory action in the event of rejection can often be decisive in such [business] deals." Further on in its report, the ICG provides a thorough diagnosis of the problem of doing business in Acheh where there exists a "system" of "predatory behavior" by the Indonesian military in its business ventures.

The scope of activities of the Indonesian military and police in legal and illegal businesses must be investigated in order to assure a smooth transition from a corporatist economy to a market economy and to guarantee that U.S. corporations are not breaking U.S. laws against corruption. U.S. corporations doing business in Acheh (and throughout Indonesian) have a legal responsibility not to support and profit from the corruption of public officials there. The military and police involvement in commercial businesses threatens the operations of a truly free market in Indonesia and the region. Because 20-25% of their expenses are budgeted, their business activities may be construed as being subsidized by the government of Indonesia. Furthermore, They also control large amounts of resources, which allow them to intervene in politics and in the free market in illegal ways. The police have violently intervened in labor disputes. The armed forces’ foundations (yayasans) represent political slush funds for opponents of reform. These foundations must be audited.

The case of ExxonMobil must be given special attention both because of the importance of its activities to the national economy of Indonesia (see Appendix B) and because of its "cosy" relationship with the Indonesian armed forces, indicating that this ‘business’ relationship may be at cross-purposes with stated foreign policy objectives of the U.S. Government. The military and police are paid by ExxonMobil to provide security for its operations in Acheh. The corporation has provided logistical support for the Indonesian military, which has been barracked at ExxonMobil facilities. The insurgents recently asked foreign corporations to leave Acheh arguing that ""the companies that are in Acheh have become bases for the TNI (ed. the Indonesian military). We don't have any problem with companies like Mobil Oil. We just ask the international world to handle the Acheh problem through law."

'Despite the corporation’s accommodation of the Indonesian security forces, ExxonMobil has seen itself targeted by soldiers and police who have shot at its planes, stolen equipment, and held for ransom some of its workers.'

Backgrounder: appendixes >>; footnotes>>